Abstract: This paper argues that Beijing's handling of the Xinjiang and Uyghur issues at the domestic, regional and international levels is characterised by a number of contradictions.
Beijing's handling of the Xinjiang and Uyghur issues at the domestic, regional and international levels is characterised by a number of contradictions. Domestically, the unrest suggests that China's longstanding approach to Xinjiang is at risk of failure due to the contradictions inherent in the logic that underpins Beijing's strategy. From
Beijing's perspective, control of Xinjiang since the early 1990s has been built upon accelerating economic growth and development in order to placate the region's nonHan ethnic groups. Yet, this has only been able to occur, in the authorities' view, so long as security and control has been resolutely maintained. However, this circular logic has proved to be fraught with two major contradictions -the program of development has arguably aggravated the Uyghurs' sense of disenfranchisement while simultaneously generating the Han Chinese population's resentment against the state for its perceived favouring of ethnic minorities. These contradictions look set to cause not only further Uyghur unrest but also an increase in inter-ethnic tension or violence between Uyghur and Han communities in Xinjiang.
Regionally, the Xinjiang and Uyghur issues have throughout the last two decades been of increasing salience in China's diplomacy in Central Asia. In particular, they Internationally, the major implication of the July unrest has been to signal the internationalisation of the Uyghur issue so that it has become a significant irritant in Beijing's relations with a number of major Western states, including the USA and Australia. While a number of geopolitical changes in the international system over the past three decades have contributed to this, it has arguably been Beijing's own approach to Xinjiang domestically, and its handling of the Uyghur issue in its diplomacy, that have contributed to the internationalisation of the issue. In particular, China's portrayal of Uyghurs as 'terrorists' since the attacks of 9/11 and the demonisation of Rebiya Kadeer in more recent times have resulted in the generation of a much higher international profile for the Uyghur and Xinjiang issues. However, the same two factors have also been important domestically in framing the issue of Uyghur opposition in distinctly nationalistic terms, increasing the potential for future inter-ethnic violence in Xinjiang.
Xinjiang, the Great Western Development and the Contradictions of China's 'Manifest Destiny'
Ever since Xinjiang was 'peacefully liberated' by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1949, China's approach to the region has been defined by one over-arching goal -to integrate Xinjiang with China. This has been a quest not only to consolidate China's territorial control and sovereignty over the region but to absorb, politically, economically and culturally, the various non-Han ethnic groups of Xinjiang into the 'unitary, multi-ethnic state' of the PRC. In this regard it is an inherently imperial project. This imperative has been informed by both geopolitics and history. Indeed, despite China's contemporary claim that Xinjiang has been 'an inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation' since the Han dynasty (206 BCE-24CE), the reality is that it was often remained beyond Chinese dominion. Indeed, the geopolitical position of the region as a 'Eurasian crossroad' combined with the ethnocultural dominance of Turkic and Mongol peoples to result in only intermittent periods of Chinese predominance and control. 9 It has only been since the Qing conquest of Xinjiang in the mid-eighteenth century that China-based states have been able to consolidate their control over the region for an extended period. From the early nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century Xinjiang experienced a significant number of rebellions/independence movements by the Turkic-Muslim peoples, often with significant external influence from Central Asia and/or the Soviet Union. and social stability will create a favourable environment for implementing the strategy'.
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On the other hand, implementing the strategy may bring about new issues and problems which might challenge national unity and social stability. Implementing the strategy will lead to further opening-up. Overseas hostile forces will probably take this opportunity to penetrate China. We must be highly vigilant on this and take effective measures to safeguard national unity and social stability in order to smoothly implement the strategy.
However, it also acknowledged that the process of accelerated economic development and integration entailed by the GWD could not only contribute to interethnic tension but also provide an opportunity for external 'hostile forces' to meddle in China: 35 This perception of a relationship between internal challenges to 'national unity' and the penetration of external influences has been a defining anxiety for Beijing in the context of Xinjiang. Yet, as we shall see below, the reliance on economic modernisation and development as an instrument to neutralise ethnic minority dissatisfaction with Chinese rule fails to account for the fact the ideology of 'developmentalism' that has engulfed Xinjiang has contributed to political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the Uyghur, providing the conditions not only for Uyghur unrest but also inter-ethnic tensions.
Yet the reliance on economic modernisation and development as an instrument to neutralise ethnic minority dissatisfaction fails to account for the fact the ideology of 'developmentalism' that has engulfed Xinjiang has contributed to political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the Uyghur, providing the conditions not only for Beijing's concern to keep the issue contained. As Sino-Soviet relations improved throughout the 1980s, however, the Uyghur issue once more faded from a position of any prominence in China's foreign relations. stronger stance on what it increasingly termed the 'three evils' of 'separatism, extremism and terrorism'. 52 These issues became a foundational concern for the S-5's successor organization, the SCO, when it was inaugurated on 14 June 2001 in Shanghai. One of the SCO's first acts was to adopt the 'Shanghai Covenant on the Suppression of Terrorism, Separatism and Religious Extremism', which declared the organization's intent to establish a regional response to the perceived threat of radical
Islam to their states. 53 The impact of 9/11 was in many respects contradictory for Beijing. On the negative economic aid packages. 54 Over the intervening seven years, however, Beijing has been able to reassert its role in the region, both bilaterally and also multilaterally through the SCO. A key element of this process has been its promotion of a normative framework for inter-state relations in Central Asia, particularly via the SCO, which privileges the maintenance of 'stability' and non-interference in 'internal affairs' of member states. In the context of the wider Islamic world, however, the Uyghur issue has had only moderate resonance due to the fact that many Islamic states, particularly in the Middle East, increasingly perceive China to be not only a major source of investment and a reliable customer for oil and gas but as a potential foil for US dominance in the region. Indeed, the lack of censure from the wider Islamic world has been remarkable with, for example, Indonesia's ambassador to China stating simply that Jakarta 75 This plan fell victim to US domestic politics as Republicans seized on it as an example of Obama's 'soft' stance on terrorism in order to score a 'hit' on the administration. 76 This was perhaps a relief for the Obama administration given that the resettlement of Uyghur detainees in the USA would have undoubtedly been perceived in Beijing as a slap in the face. In the end, the administration was able extricate itself from this dilemma by persuading Bermuda and the tiny Pacific island state of Palau in July to accept four and thirteen Uyghurs respectively. 77 potential problem in developing the administration's relationship with Beijing. 78 Perhaps it has been due to the Obama administration's desire to not complicate its relations with Beijing further that it has remained muted in its response to the Ürümqi unrest. The challenge for the Obama administration, as it was for the Bush administration, will be how to balance the USA's longstanding concern for the human rights of ethnic and religious minorities in China with its broader strategic and economic interests in which China is perceived to be playing an ever greater role. 79 Beijing's portrayal of Uyghurs as 'terrorists' has not only been an important diplomatic strategy to enhance its leverage with states such as the USA, but has also had a significant impact domestically. The domestic portrayal of Uyghurs as 'terrorists/extremists' bent on 'splitting' Xinjiang from China with the aid of 'hostile external forces' has linked in the public imagination the two enduring anxieties of Beijing in the region -separatism and foreign intervention or influence. This was reflected in the Han population's nationalistic response to the events in Ürümqi, as their ire was not only directed at the Uyghurs but also toward the West, and the USA in particular, for 'harboring' such 'splittists' as Rebiya Kadeer. 80 It is at this juncture that the discourse of the GWD intersects with China's foreign policy and diplomacy.
It will be recalled that one of the dominant themes of the GWD is that China's continued 'rise' can only be ensured through the exploitation of the abundant and 'under-developed' resources of China's west. 
Resolving Contradictions in Xinjiang and Beyond?
The core dilemma that faces Beijing in Xinjiang, as James Millward has recently noted, is one that 'is essentially the same as that in any large, modern state: how to incorporate ethno-cultural diversity into the national vision ' . 84 Yet, as we have seen, the problem is that the state's development strategy and the rhetoric that surrounds it has simultaneously contributed to the increasing political, economic, demographic and cultural marginalisation of the Uyghur and a growing sense amongst Han Chinese that Xinjiang and its future 'belong' to China. But two major implications stemming from this sense have the potential to undermine Beijing's grip on Xinjiang. The first is that historically civilizing and 'modernising' missions tend to generate greater ethnic consciousness amongst those who are being 'civilized', a dynamic that has been apparent amongst the Uyghur for some time. Beijing's approach has been self-defeating as not only did its portrayal of some Uyghurs as 'terrorists' lose traction but its concerted diplomatic offensive against Rebiya Kadeer simply brought the Uyghur issue greater international attention. Here the problem has been a failure to perceive that the strategy that has been relatively successful domestically, in terms of the portrayal of Uyghur separatism, would not work internationally. In this respect it is incredible that Beijing thought its labelling of Kadeer as the 'Uyghur Dalai Lama' would result in negative perceptions of her in the West. Thus, if Beijing wishes to diminish the influence and profile of the Uyghur issue internationally it would do well to tone down its vehement attacks on Kadeer and not assume that tactics that work domestically will produce the same results in western democratic societies.
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